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a b s t r a c t
This publication discusses new opportunities for creating threshold schemes for secret
sharing arising from the use of mathematical linguistic formalisms. Such methods are
based on known threshold schemes of information splitting extended by adding an extra
stage at which bit blocks of the shared information are coded using suitably defined
context-free grammars. In practice, this will help with developing new algorithms, which
besides allowing information sharing will also make it possible to obtain protocols for the
confidential exchange of this information with or without involving a trusted instance.
Such protocols will contribute to the development of modern cryptographic techniques
and future computer science.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One interesting subject associated with modern cryptography is the development of algorithms and protocols for split-
ting and sharing information. Such algorithmswere developed as early as the 1970s [1–3], but the increased demand for new
solutions hasmeant that scientific circles have kept looking for newermethods of ensuring the confidentiality of information
which is shared between the authorised group of participants in a given protocol. Known secret sharing methods have very
good mathematical properties and meet all requirements concerning the security of individual components of the shared
secret. However, it is worth noting that new areas for using such information splitting techniques have appeared now. Such
new areas include, for example, the possibilities of intelligently splitting or managing the components of a secret in state
administration institutions, military formations or even industrial entities [4]. In such cases, there is often a need to create
new protocols enabling the information to be intelligently split and then distributed between authorised users. This tasks
should frequently be performed taking into account the hierarchical management structure and access to confidential data.
Further examples of the use of new secret splitting procedures are applications related to exchanging and managing
multimedia content. This is because it turns out that such content can, to a great extent, carry confidential data or contain
important information on, for example, the copyright for a given work in a digital format. All of this means that issues
concerning the intelligent watermarking of digital data and conveying the copyright to the data are becoming relevant. This
is because of we want only selected groups of authorised users to have the rights to recreate split secrets or information
significant from the point of view of the authorisation or the access to strategic or multimedia data.
The need to create newalgorithmic solutions has led to the development of newalgorithms or protocols for the intelligent
splitting and management of secret information. This publication presents such a solution which employs already known
information sharing techniques [5–9] to allow creation of a more generalised protocol which can find wide-ranging uses in
the hierarchical management of strategic information or multimedia data. This algorithm will use mathematical linguistics
methods to add an extra stage to the secret splitting procedure, allowing the shared data to be coded using suitably defined
words of a context-free language introduced. The technique proposed below can play the role of a hierarchical algorithm for
secret splitting or can be used as a data sharing andmanagement protocol in hierarchical structures of companies. In terms of
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Fig. 1. Shadow generation in Tang’s secret sharing algorithm.
the security of the proposed procedure, it can be said to guarantee the complete confidentiality of the created components
of the secret [10–12]. This technique will take advantage of already known algorithms dedicated to secret splitting. The
opportunity to introduce a new method of converting the split data using grammar symbols will also be reminiscent of
modern solutions originating from DNA cryptography. However, it should be emphasised that in the classical DNA coding
approach, a notation in the form of four nitrogen bases (A, T, G, C) used to code bit pairs of the encrypted information is
employed. This publication presents a new, generalised algorithmwhich allows bit blocks of any length to be coded into new
sequences represented by the words of a context-free language. This algorithm is used to split the secret and to intelligently
manage information in a hierarchical manner.
2. An idea of secret sharing protocols
Secret sharing algorithms constitute quite a young branch of information technology and cryptography. In the most
general case, their objective is to generate such parts for the data in question as could be shared by multiple authorised
persons [13,14].What arises here is the problem of splitting information in amanner allowing its reconstruction by a certain
n-person group interested in reconstructing the split information. Algorithm solutions developed for achieving this objective
should at the same time ensure that none of the groups of participants in such a protocol whose number is less than the
requiredmpersons can read the splitmessage. The algorithms for dividing informationmake it possible to split it into chunks
known as shadows that are later distributed among the participants of the protocol so that the shares of certain subsets of
users, when combined together, can be used to reconstruct the original information. There are two groups of algorithms for
dividing information, namely, secret splitting and secret sharing ones.
In the first technique, information is distributed among the participants of the protocol, and all the participants are
required to put together their parts to have it reconstructed. A more universal method of splitting information is the
latter method, i.e. secret sharing. In this case, the message is also distributed among the participants of the protocol, yet
to have it reconstructed it is enough to have a certain number of constituent shares definedwhile building the scheme. Such
algorithms are also known as threshold schemes, and were proposed independently by Shamir [3] and Blakley [1,2], and
were thoroughly analysed by Simmons [15]. A simple example of application a secret sharing Tang algorithm for generation
of secret shadows is presented in Fig. 1.
The next section describes a method of extending classical threshold schemes for secret sharing to include an additional
linguistic stage at which binary representations of the shared secret are coded into new sequences representing the rules of
a formal grammar introduced [16]. Such a stage will introduce additional security against the unauthorised reconstruction
of the information and can be executed in two independent versions of protocols for assigning created shadows to protocol
participants. The first one is the version involving a trusted arbiter to mediate in the assignment and reconstruction of
information. The second is the version without the arbiter, but with the assignment of the introduced grammar as a new,
additional part of the secret.
3. Protocol for linguistic shadow generation
Executing the secret sharing protocol with the use of sequential grammars will lead to generating one additional shadow
for the shared information. A context-free grammar will be used here to introduce an additional stage of coding the input
representation of the shared data or the secret allocated in a hierarchical way.
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The context-free grammar in general is defined by the following formula [16]:
GSECRET = (ΣN ,ΣT , PS, SS),
where:
ΣN is a set of non-terminal symbols;
ΣT is a set of terminal symbols;
SS is a grammar start symbol;
PS is a set of grammar rules in the form A→ γ , where A ∈ ΣN , and γ ∈ (ΣN ∪ΣT )+.
In practice, the use of such grammarwill allow us to strengthen the secret splitting algorithm used and to obtain a certain
additional secret (a part of the split information) in the form of rules of the formal grammar used.
The general methodology of using formal languages to enhance a classical threshold scheme is as follows:
1. one of the classical secret sharing scheme algorithms is selected to encode the converted secret;
2. the input secret is transformed into a bit sequence;
3. a formal grammar is defined, and generates bit or bit block positions for the shared data;
4. the bit block sequence is parsed with an analyser defined for the grammar introduced;
5. the parsing generates a sequence of grammar rules (from the PS set) which allow the bit representation of the shared
secret to be generated;
6. the secret represented by a sequence of production numbers is split using the threshold scheme selected in step 1;
7. shadows obtained are distributed to particular participants of the protocol.
These stages determine the basic actions necessary for generating the components of shared information which can be
communicated to the participants in the entire procedure of allocating the split data.
4. Grammar for bit block coding
Expansion of the threshold scheme by an additional stage of converting the secret recorded in the form of a bit sequence
is performed thanks to the application of a context-free grammar.
Depending on the production set, such a grammar can change the bit sequences in the form of zeros and ones into a
sequence of grammar production numbers that allow the generation of the original bit sequence.
The conversion of the representation is ensured through a syntax analyser that changes the bit sequence into numbers
of linguistic rules of the grammar in square time. The graphical representation of using the grammar expansion in classical
threshold schemes is presented in Fig. 2.
After performing such a transformation, any scheme of secret sharing can be applied to distribute the constituents among
any number n of participants of the protocol. This means that at this stage, any classical (m, n)-threshold algorithm for
secret sharing can be run. However, the secret being split is not a pure bit sequence, but a sequence composed of numbers
of syntactic rules of the grammar introduced. Depending on its structure and type, it can contain values of two or more
bits. So you can imagine a situation in which the grammar conversion will not consist in transforming single bits, but will
also involve transforming pairs or greater numbers of bits at the same time (i.e. values of two, three, four and more bits
will be considered). In that case, the structure of the grammar will be similar, but the sequence of generation rule numbers
obtained will have a greater range of values (i.e. the number of generation rules of the grammar defined for the conversion
will increase).
To illustrate the idea of an enhanced linguistic coding, a generalised version of a linguistic information splitting algorithm
will be presented for a grammar that converts blocks of several bits.
G = (ΣN ,ΣT , PS, SS),
where:
ΣN = {SECRET, BLOCK, 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, . . . ,NB} is a set of non-terminal symbols.
ΣT = {1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, . . . , nb, λ} is a set of terminal symbols which define each bit block value.
{λ} defines an empty symbol.
SS = SECRET is the grammar start symbol.
A production set PS is defined in following way.
1. SECRET→ BLOCK.
2. BLOCK→ BLOCK BLOCK.
3. BLOCK→ 1B | 2B | 3B | 4B | 5B | 6B, . . . | NB.
4. BLOCK→ λ.
5. 1B→ 1b.
6. 2B→ 2b.
7. 3B→ 3b.
8. 4B→ 4b.
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Fig. 2. Shadow generation scheme in the expanded threshold algorithm. The expansion concerns the use of grammar at the stage of converting the bit
representation into sequences of numbers of linguistic rules in grammar.
9. 5B→ 5b.
10. 6B→ 6b.
11. . . .
12. NB→ nb.
13. b→ {0, 1}.
A grammar introduced in this way can support a quicker and briefer recoding of the input representation of the secret to
be shared. Versions for longer bit blocks can be used in the same way. However, this will require introducing a greater
number of linguistic rules. An obvious benefit of grouping bits into larger blocks is that during the following steps of
the secret sharing protocol we get shorter representations for the split data. This is particularly visible when executing
procedures that use excessive bit representations, i.e. when single-bit or several-bit values are saved and interpreted using
codes in 8-bit or 16-bit representations.
As said previously, executing the algorithms introduced provides an additional stage for recoding the shared secret into
a new representation using grammatical rules. The grammar itself can be kept secret or made available to the participants
of the entire protocol.
If the allocation of grammatical rules is to remain secret, as mentioned earlier, what we deal with is an arbitration
protocol, which – to reconstruct the secret for the authorised group of shadow owners – requires the participation of a
trusted arbiter, equipped with information about grammar rules.
Should the grammar be disclosed, the reconstruction of the secret is possible without the participation of the trusted
person and only on the basis of the constituent parts of the secret kept by the authorised group of participants in the
algorithm of information sharing.
The most important characteristics of the proposed method of linguistic secret splitting include:
• The multinomial complexity of the proper secret splitting algorithm. This is due to the fact that the entire syntactic
analysis process using the control table of a parser exhibits a square complexity in the case of context-free grammars. If
any of the known secret sharing algorithms is used, this complexity is usually at the multinomial level. So ultimately, the
execution of independent stages of the linguistic coding and splitting using one of the classical secret sharing algorithms
will also reach the multinomial level.
• The complexity of shadow communication and assignment in hierarchical structures can be estimated at themultinomial
level. It shows a straight-line dependence on the number of levels in the hierarchical structure and the complexity
determined for a single stage of linguistic secret splitting (estimated above).
• So the proposed method can be used, besides for purely numerical schemes of secret sharing, also for secret splitting
methods based on the algebraic vector space. With an approach based on a vector space, the grammatical conversion
relates to changing the representation of those coordinates of the feature vector which are directly responsible for
the input information and which represent the split secret. In the case of the effect of distributing the input data
representation over an n-dimensional vector, all coordinates of this vector will be subjected to the conversion.
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• The security of the proposed algorithm and its resistance to cryptanalytical attacks is at least equal to that of the
classical secret sharing algorithmselected for implementing thismethod. The application of thenewprocedures produces
shadows generated using both the classical secret splitting algorithm and also additional information related to the
numerical sequence determining the form of the linguistic rules of the defined grammar. This additional information
can play the role of another component of the secret (i.e. another shadow) or can be shared together with the input
information converted using the grammar. If this information is used as an additional secret component, this leads to a
situation in which one of the components must always be present for the entire secret to be recreated. Thus it is possible
to create a group of privileged participants who possessmore important components necessary to reconstruct the secret.
This approach can be used in attempts to centralise the information flow.
5. Conclusion
This publication presents a new information sharing algorithm based on the use of mathematical linguistics methods.
This procedure can be used both as a new type of algorithm for secret splitting methods and as an intelligent protocol for
assigning secret components to the authorised participants of such a protocol.
It is worth noting that the method presented essentially represents an extension of classical secret sharing methods by
means of adding a new stage of input information coding into the form of sequences of numbers of linguistic rules which
represent bit blocks of various lengths. The security of this method is guaranteed by the mathematical properties of the
information splitting methods used, while the stage of additionally coding bit blocks does not make the cryptanalysis of
this scheme any easier. This means that the information shadows generated are completely secure and without having the
required number of them there is no way to reconstruct the original secret. It is also worth noting that the complexity of
the conversion of bit blocks into sequences of numbers of syntactic rules of the grammar introduced is at the square level
O(n2). Such a complexity characterises syntactic analysers created for context-free languages. Ultimately, the complexity of
the entire process of creating the components of the split secret remains at the multinomial level.
Another important feature of the approach put forward is that the proposed linguistic scheme for bit block coding is a
far-reaching extension of the method of secret information coding used in DNA cryptographic methods. However, unlike
in the technique of converting bit pairs into particular nitrogen bases used in that method, in our procedure it is possible
to code larger bit blocks, which significantly enhances the opportunities for using this technique of information hiding or
splitting.
The proposed algorithm is dedicated to the hierarchical splitting of important strategic information. Hence, it can be
used to manage and send such information within various data management structures, including for example linear or
divisional ones. Its strength comes from the ability to make hierarchical splits which take into account the level of access of
particular persons (or instances) to the specific secret. Further possible applications are techniques of intelligentmultimedia
data watermarking which allow digital information about the copyright to be split between the authors of a given work (an
image, a piece of music or a video sequence) and the institution in charge of protecting intellectual property. Parts split in
this way can be inserted using digital watermarking techniques into the given work distributed in the digital format, and
when it is necessary to verify the rights concerning the creation of the work, authors can cooperate with institutions that
manage and protect such rights.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the AGH University of Science and Technology under Grant No. 10.10.120.783.
References
[1] G.R. Blakley, Safeguarding cryptographic keys, in: Proceedings of the National Computer Conference, 1979, pp. 313–317.
[2] G.R. Blakley, One-time pads are key safeguarding schemes, not cryptosystems: Fast key safeguarding schemes (threshold schemes) exist,
in: Proceedings of the 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Press, 1980, pp. 108–113.
[3] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM (1979) 612–613.
[4] M.R. Ogiela, U. Ogiela, Linguistic cryptographic threshold schemes, International Journal of Future Generation Communication and Networking 1 (2)
(2009) 33–40.
[5] G. Ateniese, C. Blundo, A. De Santis, D.R. Stinson, Constructions and bounds for visual cryptography, in: LNCS, vol. 1099, 1996, pp. 416–428.
[6] P. Beguin, A. Cresti, General short computational secret sharing schemes, in: LNCS, vol. 921, 1995, pp. 194–208.
[7] A. Beimel, B. Chor, Universally ideal secret sharing schemes, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 40 (1994) 786–794.
[8] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, Lower bounds for robust secret sharing schemes, Information Processing Letters 63 (1997) 317–321.
[9] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk, Generalised cumulative arrays and their application to secret sharing schemes, Australian Computer Science Communications
17 (1995) 61–65.
[10] Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel, Threshold cryptosystems, in: Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’89 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 307–315.
[11] N. Hang, W. Zhao, Privacy-preserving data mining systems, Computer 40 (2007) 52–58.
[12] W.-A. Jackson, K.M. Martin, C.M. O’Keefe, Ideal secret sharing schemes with multiple secrets, Journal of Cryptology 9 (1996) 233–250.
[13] S. Tang, Simple secret sharing and threshold RSA signature schemes, Journal of Information and Computational Science 1 (2004) 259–262.
[14] T.-C. Wu, W.-H. He, A geometric approach for sharing secrets, Computers and Security 14 (1995) 135–146.
[15] G.J. Simmons, An introduction to shared secret and/or shared control schemes and their application in contemporary cryptology, in: The Science of
Information Integrity, IEEE Press, 1992, pp. 441–497.
[16] M.R. Ogiela, R. Tadeusiewicz, Modern Computational Intelligence Methods for the Interpretation of Medical Images, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2008.
